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			 Calculation	starts	by	establishing	distinctions	between	things	or	states	of	the	world,	and	by	imagining	and	estimating	courses	of	action	associated	with	those	things	or	with	those	states	as	well	as	their	consequences	(Callon	and	Muniesa,	2005:	1231).		[Risk	calculation	beyond	probability]	seeks	not	to	forestall	the	future	via	calculation	but	to	incorporate	the	very	unknowability	and	profound	uncertainty	of	the	future	into	imminent	decision	(Amoore,	2013:	9).		 What	is	certain	is	that	this	epidemic	of	‘passive	obesity’	is	unlikely	to	come	to	a	natural	end,	i.e.	without	intervention	(Foresight,	2007:	17).		Making	calculations	about	the	future	is	a	central	activity	of	government,	and	hence	is	one	way	in	which	power	functions.	This	Chapter	approaches	the	question	of	calculation	via	a	focus	on	the	British	government’s	ongoing	public	health	campaign,	Change4Life.		This	is	a	social	marketing	campaign	that	seeks	to	intervene	in	an	impending	obesity	crisis,	as	the	above	quotation	from	a	report	published	by	the	government’s	‘horizon	scanning’	centre1,	Foresight,	demonstrates,	and	to	which	Change4Life	responds.	The	Chapter	draws	on	an	argument	made	in	previous	work	(Coleman,	2012)	that	analyses	the	campaign	as	a	series	of	images,	but	here	I	develop	this	analysis	to	more	clearly	focus	on	how	Change4Life	functions	as	a	social	marketing	campaign,	which	extends	economic	calculation	into	the	realm	of	the	social.	My	specific	interest	is	in	exploring	further	what	Michel	Callon	and	Fabian	Muniesa	(2005)	refer	to	above	as	the	imaginative	and/or	estimative	aspects	of	calculation.		I	will	suggest	that	‘establishing	distinctions	between	things	or	states	of	the	world’	has	a	temporal	dimension,	whereby	differences	are	made	between	what	is	apparently	evident	in	the	present,	and	what	might	be	possible	in	the	
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future.		And	I	will	argue	that	such	a	mode	of	calculation	is	becoming	a	central	means	through	which	power	operates	today;	that	is,	as	the	quotation	from	Louise	Amoore	(2013)	indicates,	power	is	increasingly	becoming	caught	up	in,	and	filtered	through,	a	pre-emptive	temporality,	where	the	future	is	brought	into	and	comes	to	organise	the	present	–	for	some	social	groups	more	than	for	others.			
Change4Life	The	most	visible	way	in	which	the	UK	government	has	attempted	to	deal	with	the	impending	obesity	crisis	is	the	Change4Life	campaign.	Officially	launched	in	January	2009	as	a	‘lifestyle	revolution’	(Secretary	of	State	for	Health	Alan	Johnson,	quoted	in	Donaldson	and	Beasley,	2008:	2),	the	Department	of	Health	describes	this	campaign	as	‘a	society-wide	movement	that	aims	to	prevent	people	from	becoming	overweight	by	encouraging	them	to	eat	better	and	move	more’.	The	campaign	is	described	as	both	‘the	marketing	component	of	the	Government’s	response	to	the	rise	in	obesity’	and,	more	widely,	as	a	‘social	marketing	campaign’	(Department	of	Health,	2010:	13,	my	emphasis),	so	that	‘[r]ather	than	taking	a	top-down	approach,	the	campaign	set	out	to	use	marketing	as	a	catalyst	for	a	broader	societal	movement	in	which	everyone	who	had	an	interest	in	preventing	obesity	[…]	could	play	a	part’	(2010:	13-14).	The	campaign	has	thus	involved	a	wide	range	of	high	profile	activities	across	different	platforms,	including	traditional	forms	of	advertising	on	television	and	billboards,	digital	communications,	relationship	marketing	and	stakeholder	engagement	via	events	and	tutorials,	and	has	been	addressed	to	a	variety	of	social	groups.	Indeed,	as	I	will	discuss	below,	Change4Life	works	through	specific	calculations	that	consider	particular	groups	as	at	risk	of	obesity,	now	and/or	in	the	future.		
Calculation,	markets	and	social	marketing	‘Calculation’	has	been	theorised	from	a	number	of	different	perspectives,	with	arguments	from	Science	and	Technology	Studies	being	particularly	prevalent.2		For	Callon	and	Muneisa,	for	example,	it	is	necessary	to	develop	a	concept	of	calculation	in	order	to	understand	how	markets	function	as	‘collective	devices	that	allow	compromises	to	be	reached,	not	only	on	the	nature	of	the	goods	to	produce	and	distribute	but	also	on	the	value	to	be	given	to	them’,	in	both	abstract	and	practical	senses	(2005:	1229).	These	authors	argue	that	existing	theories	of	calculation	require	re-thinking.	While	neoclassical	economic	theory	tends	to	see	calculation	as	the	inevitable	result	of	the	rational,	calculative	nature	of	individual	agents,	Sociology	and	Anthropology	challenge	the	idea	of	‘pure’	calculation,	providing	detailed	accounts	of	how	calculative	behaviours	
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are	sets	of	judgements	that	emerge	out	of	heterogeneous	interactions	and	decisions	(2005:	1230).		The	result	of	these	two	approaches	is	that	either	the	quantitative	or	qualitative	aspects	of	calculation	is	emphasised,	and	that	calculation	and	judgement	are	separated;	a	divide	they	counteract	by	offering	their	definition	of	calculation,	as	set	out	above,	that	works	through	a	three-step	process.			The	first	step	is	an	awareness	that	‘[a]	finite	set	of	entities	are	moved,	arranged	and	ordered	in	a	single	space’	(2005:	1231).		‘An	invoice,	a	grid,	a	factory,	a	trading	screen,	a	trading	room,	a	spreadsheet,	a	clearing-house,	a	computer	memory,	a	shopping	cart’	(2005:	1231)	are	all	cases	of	this	‘single	space’.		This	first	step	thus	involves	the	detachment	of	‘the	entities	taken	into	account’	from	one	site	and	their	movement	into	another,	in	order	for	them	to	become	calculable	(2005:	1231).		The	second	step	involves	the	‘manipulations	and	transformations’	of	these	entities	that	have	become	associated	with	each	other	(2005:	1231);	and	the	third	step	is	‘a	result	[that]	has	to	be	extracted’	(2005:	1231):			 A	new	entity	must	be	produced	(a	sum,	an	ordered	list,	an	evaluation,	a	binary	choice,	etc.)	that	corresponds	precisely	to	the	manipulations	effected	in	the	calculative	space	and,	consequently,	links	(summa-rises)	the	entities	taken	into	account.	This	resulting	entity	is	not	new,	in	the	sense	of	springing	from	nowhere;	it	is	prefigured	by	the	considerations	described	above	[in	step	one	and	two].	But	it	has	to	be	able	to	leave	the	calculable	space	and	circulate	elsewhere	in	an	acceptable	way	(without	taking	with	it	the	whole	calculative	apparatus).			Callon	and	Muniesa	(2005)	argue	that	their	conception	of	calculation	draws	attention	to	the	politics	of	markets,	especially	in	providing	empirical	and	theoretical	means	for	studying	the	many,	potentially	divergent,	entities	that	become	associated	and	the	different	steps	through	which	calculation	occurs.		Such	attention,	they	suggest,	opens	up	debate	on	how	‘there	are	several	ways	of	calculating	values	and	reaching	compromises’	(2005:	1245).		What	entities	are	included	and	excluded	from	a	space	of	calculation,	for	instance?		What	manipulations	and	transformations	occur?		What	is	the	new	entity	that	is	produced,	and	how	does	it	circulate	beyond	the	space	in	which	it	was	created?				These	questions	can	begin	to	be	addressed	in	terms	of	the	Foresight	report,	briefly	introduced	above,	which	sought	to	‘challenge	the	simple	portrayal	of	obesity	as	an	issue	of	personal	willpower’	by	emphasising	social	environment	(2007:	i).	It	is	largely	based	
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on	quantitative	modelling	of	future	trends,	using	a	dataset	that	shows	that,	in	2004,	23.6%	of	UK	men	and	23.8%	of	women	were	obese	(Foresight	2007:	26).	Foresight	predict	that,	by	2015,	36%	of	adult	males	and	28%	of	adult	females	will	be	obese;	by	2025	this	will	rise	to	47%	and	36%	respectively;	and,	by	2050,	this	could	be	60%	and	50%	respectively	(2007:	35).		Calculating	future	trends	for	children	is	‘controversial	because	of	difficulties	stemming	from	variation	in	normal	patterns	of	growth,	weight	gain	and	changes	in	body	composition’	(Foresight,	2007:	26).	However,	based	on	current	levels	of	8%	of	males	and	10%	of	females	who	are	obese,	and	taking	into	consideration	the	uncertain	results	of	their	methodology,	the	Foresight	report	suggests	that,	by	2015,	15%	of	under	20s	are	predicted	to	be	obese,	and	by	2050,	this	could	be	25%	(2007:	36).			It	is	worth	noting	here	that	the	Foresight	report	focuses	only	on	obesity,	whereas	for	the	Change4Life	movement	it	is	the	categories	of	obese	and	overweight	that	are	at	stake.	This	makes	it	difficult	to	trace	how	the	Foresight	predictions	that	by	2050	obesity	levels	could	be	at	60%	for	men	and	50%	for	women	map	onto	those	stated	by	Change4Life,	i.e.	that	‘by	2050	nine	out	of	ten	adults	could	be	overweight	or	obese’.	However,	these	higher	statistics	related	to	obesity	and	overweight	are	reiterated	in	various	ways	across	the	Change4Life	movement:			By	the	time	we	reach	middle	age,	the	majority	of	us	could	do	with	losing	at	least	a	bit	of	weight	(Change4Life	website,	About	Change4Life	page).		kids	need	to	do	at	least	60	minutes	of	physical	activity	that	gets	their	hearts	beating	fasting	than	usual.	And	they	need	to	do	it	every	day	to	burn	off	calories	and	prevent	them	storing	up	excess	fat	in	the	body	(Change4Life	website,	Get	Going	page)	3.		Likewise,	one	of	the	television	adverts	(‘What’s	it	all	about?’,	2009)	asserts	that,	if	we	don’t	something	now,	‘nine	out	of	ten	of	our	kids	would	grow	up	to	have	dangerous	amounts	of	fat	built	up	in	their	bodies,	which	meant	they’d	be	more	likely	to	get	horrid	things	like	heart	disease,	type	2	diabetes,	and	cancer’.		The	Change4Life	campaign	can	be	conceived	in	terms	of	Callon	and	Muniesa’s	(2005)	definition	of	calculation	as	bringing	different	entities	into	association	in	a	particular	space,	manipulating	and	transforming	these	entities	via	calculation,	and	producing	a	new	entity	out	of	this	calculative	space,	which	can	nevertheless	circulate	on	its	own	
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terms.		Thus,	Foresight	brings	into	relation	a	number	of	different	human	and	non-humans	–	bodies,	genders,	ages,	weights,	temporal	points	(the	years	2004,	2015,	2050	for	example)	–	and	manipulates	and	transforms	these	associations	via	a	series	of	calculative	methodologies	into	a	set	of	predictions	about	future	levels	of	obesity.		Change4Life	is	the	response	to	these	predictions,	that	is,	it	is	the	creation	of	a	new	entity	that	emerges	out	of,	but	circulates	without	reference	to,	Foresight’s	calculations.		In	addition	to	the	focus	on	the	politics	of	markets,	Callon	and	Muniesa	propose	that	their	definition	of	calculation	also	enables	an	attention	to	‘the	increasing	role	of	research	and	
experimentation	in	the	conception	of	markets’	(2005:	1245,	my	emphasis).			This	interest	in	experimentation	is	significant	to	my	focus	on	the	Change4Life	campaign	for	(at	least)	two	reasons.		First,	as	I	will	discuss	in	more	detail	below,	experimentation	suggests	an	open-ended	notion	of	futurity.		That	is,	calculation	is	not	only	or	so	much	involved	in	the	taming	of	the	future	as	it	is	in	recognising	its	uncertainty.		Second,	Callon	and	Muniesa’s	account	of	the	market	as	constituted,	at	least	in	part,	via	experimentation,	can	be	extended	to	an	understanding	of	marketing,	and	of	social	marketing	especially.			Liz	Moor’s	(2011,	2012)	insights	are	particularly	illuminating	here.		In	her	analyses	of	social	marketing,	Moor	puts	to	work	a	framework	derived	from	Actor-Network-Theory,	which	sees	social	marketing	as	a	‘project	or	network’	into	which	human	and	non-human	agencies	are	enrolled	so	as	to	‘forge	ties	and	attachments	between	them	and	to	stabilise	ties	through	durable	materials’	(2012:	566).		Although	not	discussing	Callon	and	Muniesa’s	conception	of	markets	as	calculative	devices,	Moor’s	account	of	social	marketing	attends	to	the	ways	in	which	different	entities	are	brought	into	a	calculable	space	and	a	new	entity	is	produced.		Indeed,	Moor	explains	that	social	marketing,	which	has	its	roots	in	1960s	and	1970s	America	(2012:	566),	was	developed	specifically	‘as	a	
market’	(2012:	569),	a	deliberate	experimentation	with	extending	the	territories	and	influences	of	marketing	into	the	social	realm,	‘tak[ing]	on	responsibilities	that	otherwise	might	be	taken	up	by	the	state’	(2012:	567).4			As	such,	social	marketing	established	new	associations	between	entities	(populations,	technologies,	knowledges)	and	created	a	new	entity	(a	market	or	series	of	markets)5.				Furthermore,	as	Moor	outlines,	in	its	extension	from	the	economic	to	the	social	and/or	cultural	realm,	social	marketing	has	been	enthusiastically	taken	up	by	Western	governments.6		For	example	–	and	importantly	for	the	focus	of	this	Chapter	–	in	the	UK	in	2006	the	Department	of	Health	established	the	National	Social	Marketing	Centre	(NSMC),	which	‘through	various	reports,	white	papers	and	a	large	grant,	[was]	endowed	
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…	with	the	authority	and	resources	to	draw	other	institutions	and	agencies	into	its	orbit’	(Moor,	2012:	569).	The	NSMC	produces	a	range	of	social	marketing	resources,	including	offering	training	and	mentoring	for	practitioners,	and	creating	networks	of	affiliated	organisations	and	researchers,	who,	as	Moor	notes,	are	‘then	very	well	placed	to	win	contracts	for	large-scale,	national-level	health	interventions	based	on	social	marketing	techniques	and	insights’	(2012:	569).		Significantly,	given	its	instigation	in	the	Department	of	Health,	the	NSMC	has	focused	heavily	on	‘health	equity’	projects,	including	developing	England’s	national	marketing	strategy	for	tobacco	control	(2007-2010)	and	Change4Life	(2008	–	ongoing).		While	questions	of	politics	and	power	are	of	course	not	only	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	calculations	that	governments	might	make	–	as	Callon	and	Muniesa’s	(2005)	conception	of	calculation	makes	clear,	politics	are	apparent	across	a	range	of	different	fields	–	government	initiatives	are	one	way	in	which	it	is	helpful	to	examine	how	power	functions	via	calculation.		Indeed,	Moor	posits	social	marketing	‘as	a	form	of	governance	involving	the	deployment	and	coordination	of	a	variety	of	actors,	representations,	techniques,	and	objects’	and	argues	that	the	‘NSMC’s	methods	for	identifying	and	describing	populations,	and	for	working	on	and	measuring	them,	are	also	grounded	in	a	market	model	in	which	populations	are	considered	above	all	as	consumers	rather	than,	for	example,	citizens	or	patients’	(2011:	300).		In	this	way,	social	marketing	is	part	of	wider	neo-liberal	modes	of	governance,	where	‘social	interventions	are	brought	into	the	frame	of	economic	calculation’	(Moor	2011:	310).				It	is	certainly	plausible	to	understand	the	Change4Life	campaign	along	these	lines:	the	Department	of	Health’s	One	Year	On	report	on	Change4Life	explicitly	describes	the	campaign	as	a	response	not	only	to	an	impending	health	crisis,	but	also	to	a	potential	financial	crisis,	stating	that	‘[t]he	annual	cost	to	society	of	obesity-related	illness	could	reach	£50	billion	by	2050	at	today’s	prices’	(2010:	11).	Other	analyses	of	Change4Life	have	also	highlighted	its	role	as	a	neo-liberal	form	of	governance.		For	example,	Bethan	Evans	et	al.	(2011)	have	argued	that,	while	it	attempts	to	locate	individuals	within	broader	social	contexts	and	to	problematise	the	notion	of	obesity	being	the	consequence	of	a	failure	of	willpower,	the	campaign	ends	up	reinforcing	‘a	neoliberal,	rational	model	of	embodiment,	in	which	a	healthy	body	is	seen	as	a	product	of	conscious	control	persists	as	the	assumed	“healthy”	model’	(2011:	333).			Drawing	on	Andrew	Barry’s	(2002)	conception	of	‘the	politics	of	calculation’,	which	posits	measurement	as	the	method	through	which	‘a	whole	range	of	objects	and	problems	[are]	brought	into	the	
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frame	of	economic	calculation’	(Barry	2002:	273,	cited	in	Moor	2011:	312),	Moor	proposes	that	‘once	[objects	and	problems]	become	calculable,	it	is	assumed	that	political	contestation	over	the	nature	of	the	problem	has	ended’	(2011:	312).		As	such,		 	the	interventions	of	the	NSMC	may	have	short-	or	longer-term	benefits	for	the	populations	they	target,	but	they	may	also	–	through	their	institutionalization,	standardization,	and	focus	on	calculation	and	measurement	–	have	the	effect	of	stifling	debate	about	the	causes	of	social	problems	and	the	best	way	to	address	them	(2011:	312).			In	other	words,	as	a	social	marketing	campaign	that	extends	economic	calculation	into	the	social	realm	and	where	measurements	about	weight	are	absolutely	crucial,	Change4Life	both	addresses	itself	to	and	solves	the	problem	of	obesity.		The	politics	of	calculation	–	where,	as	Callon	and	Muniesa	(2005)	argue,	there	are	‘several	ways	of	calculating	values	and	reaching	compromises’	–	is	closed	off	from	further	exploration,	and	value	–	both	economic	and	moral	(see	Throsby,	2009;	Evans	et	al.,	2010)	–	is	filtered	through	a	neo-liberal	agenda.					Drawing	on	these	arguments	concerning	neo-liberal	politics	and	the	extension	of	economic	calculation	into	the	social	through	social	marketing,	in	the	next	section	I	examine	the	imaginative	and/or	estimative	aspects	of	calculation	and	social	marketing	as	experimental	and/or	performative	(in	that	it	constitutes	new	associations	and	entities)	in	more	detail,	paying	particular	attention	to	how	power	operates	through	a	concern	with	futurity.		
Prevention,	pre-emption	and	the	uncertain	future	As	discussed	above,	social	marketing	can	be	understood	as	a	performative	discipline,	in	that	it	was	in	the	first	instance	concerned	with	the	creation	of	new	markets	(seeking	to	adjust	social	rather	than,	or	as	well	as,	economic	behaviour)	and	–	more	broadly	–	because	it	brings	into	being	that	in	which	it	seeks	to	intervene.	Moor	argues	that	the	performative	character	of	social	marketing		 is	especially	clear	in	the	case	of	the	NSMC,	which	[…]	was	given	the	authority	to	constitute	itself	as	a	source	of	knowledge	and	expertise,	to	construct	various	populations	(including	health-care	professionals	as	well	as	unhealthy	
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populations)	as	legitimate	objects	of	that	authority,	and	to	seek	to	remake	those	object-worlds	in	its	own	image	(2011:	306).		In	the	sense	of	their	performativity,	social	marketing	campaigns,	such	as	Change4Life,	can	be	understood	to	be	engaged	in	the	construction	of	particular	futures:	Foresight’s	insistence	that	the	‘epidemic	of	“passive	obesity”	is	unlikely	to	come	to	a	natural	end’	(2007:	17)	sees	Change4Life	intervening	in	what	is	set	up	to	be	the	involuntary	unfolding	of	an	obese,	and	thus	unhealthy	and	costly,	future.		In	this	way,	the	campaign	seeks	to	create	the	possibility	of	an	alternative	and	better	future.		In	the	words	of	one	of	the	television	advertisements,	the	campaign	aims	to	get	us	moving	more	and	eating	better	so	that	we	can	‘all	live	[…]	happily,	not	exactly	ever	after,	but	more	ever	after	than	we	had	done’	(‘What’s	it	all	about?’	TV	advert,	2009).			If	social	marketing	can	be	understood	as	a	mode	of	governance	that	is	central	to	contemporary	Britain,	the	campaign’s	intention	to	enrol	us	in	the	creation	of	a	better	future	through	exercise	and	healthy	eating	can	be	placed	within	a	wider	context,	where	power	has	become	concerned	with	and	refracted	through	the	future	(Coleman,	2012).			One	way	to	conceive	the	relationship	that	Change4Life	has	to	the	future	is	in	terms	of	prediction.		As	I	have	suggested	above,	based	on	levels	of	obesity	in	2004,	the	Foresight	report	makes	predictions	about	levels	of	obesity	in	2015	and	2050.	These	predictions	are	then	mobilised	by	Change4Life,	as	government	documents	explicitly	state,	in	the	creation	of	a	‘preventative	not	remedial’	social	marketing	campaign:		 the	programme	was	not	set	up	to	recruit	overweight	or	obese	children	into	weight	loss	programmes	but	to	change	the	way	all	of	us	raise	and	nourish	our	children,	with	the	aim	of	creating	a	cohort	of	5–11	year	olds	who	have	a	healthy	relationship	with	food	and	activity	(Department	of	Health,	2010:	13).		Prevention,	according	to	Brian	Massumi	(2005),	is	associated	with	a	mode	of	power	underpinned	by	a	linear	temporality;	it	is	rooted	in	the	present	and	seeks	to	prevent	an	event	happening	in	the	future.	However,	in	contrast	to	being	a	preventative	campaign,	Change4Life	might	be	better	understood	as	pre-emptive.			Pre-emption,	Massumi	argues,	is	performative	in	that	it		does	not	prevent,	it	effects.	It	induces	the	event,	in	effect.	Rather	than	acting	in	
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the	present	to	avoid	an	occurrence	in	the	future,	preemption	brings	the	future	into	the	present.	It	makes	the	present	the	future	consequences	of	an	eventuality	that	may	or	may	not	occur,	indifferent	to	its	actual	occurrence.	The	event’s	consequences	precede	it,	as	if	it	had	already	occurred	(2005:	8).		The	linear	progressive	temporality	of	prevention	is	thus	re-worked	with	pre-emptive	politics.	Pre-emption	‘suspends	the	place	of	the	present	in	the	traditional	time-line’	(Massumi	2005:	9)	and,	instead,	‘brings	the	future	into	the	present’	so	that	the	future	is	an	event	that	exists	and	must	be	acted	on	in	the	present.	Whether	or	not	the	prediction	that	in	future	‘nine	out	of	ten	of	our	kids	would	grow	up	to	have	dangerous	amounts	of	fat	built	up	in	their	bodies’	is	correct	or	will	occur,	it	is	brought	into	the	present	and	effects	the	present,	‘as	if’	the	event	‘had	already	occurred’7.			This	disruption	of	linear	progression	amplifies	the	role	of	uncertainty	in	contemporary	socio-economic	life.	Projections	have	always	involved	uncertainty	because,	as	Massumi	argues,	‘[t]here	is	always	an	“if”,	since	[projections]	indicate	trends	rather	than	grounding	laws’	(Massumi,	2005:	3).	Projections	associated	with	prevention	depend	on	the	control	of	such	uncertainty	through	linear	progression	(‘this	past	will	result	in	this	present	and	then	in	this	future’).		Linear	progression	remains	integral	to	Change4Life,	in	that	the	campaign	aims	to	intervene	in	the	present	to	avoid	an	obese	future	unfolding,	seemingly	passively.		However,	with	Change4Life,	uncertainty	becomes	that	which	must	not	so	much	be	controlled	as	oriented	around:	‘the	trend	is	characterized	by	uncertainty’	(Massumi,	2005:	3,	my	emphasis).		The	temporality	of	linear	progression	is	thus	replaced	by	(or	at	least	joined	by)	a	temporality	that	prioritises	the	uncertain	future.		‘The	centre	of	gravity’	is	shifted	from	preventing	an	event	via	a	more	or	less	smooth	unfolding	of	the	present	into	the	future,	to	a	threat;	‘an	indefinite	future	tense:	what	may	yet	come’	(Massumi,	2005:	3).	The	political	axis	comes	to	‘act	on	the	future’	(Massumi,	2005:	3).		Discussing	the	increasing	prevalence	of	pre-emptive	politics,	Amoore	draws	attention	to	the	changing	function	of	calculation	within	such	a	context.8		Beginning	with	Ulrich	Beck’s	(1992)	influential	work	on	risk	society,	in	which	the	uncertain	future	is	to	be	managed	and	tamed,	she	explains	that	Beck	sees	‘the	limits	of	risk	society	[as]	reached	when	threats	and	dangers	run	out	of	control	and	actuarial	calculations	can	no	longer	be	made’	(2013:	7).	However,	Amoore	argues	that,	rather	than	signaling	the	end	of	risk	calculation,	as	Beck’s	approach	would	suggest,	events	such	as	9/11	and	the	financial	
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crash	of	2007,	indicate	a	‘politics	of	possibility	[that]	pushes	back	the	limits	of	risk	calculation	beyond	probability’	(2013:	8).			Probability	–	calculated	at	least	in	part	through	prediction	–	is	replaced	by	(or	joined	by)	uncertainty	and	possibility.		One	of	the	central	features	of	such	a	politics	of	possibility	is	the	disturbance	of	the	linear	temporality	that	risk	calculations	developed	in	the	nineteenth-	and	early	twentieth-century	worked	through.		Here,	‘[t]he	collection	of	knowledge	on	the	past	–	in	the	form	of	data	analysed	for	statistical	purposes	and	calculated	in	the	present	–	became	the	dominant	risk	tool	for	predicting	and	controlling	the	future’	(Amoore,	2013:	63).		These	earlier	calculative	projects	work	via	a	linear	temporality	in	an	attempt	to	control	the	future.		In	contrast,	the	politics	of	possibility	‘acts	not	to	prevent	the	playing	out	of	a	particular	course	of	events	on	the	basis	of	past	data	tracked	forward	into	probable	futures	but	to	preempt	an	unfolding	and	emergent	event	in	relation	to	an	array	of	possible	projected	futures’	(2013:	9).		For	Amoore,	this	pre-emptive	temporality	occurs	through	derivative	forms	of	risk,	where	data	can	be	assembled	and	re-assembled	in	ways	that	are	‘indifferent	to,	and	in	isolation	from,	underlying	probabilities’	(Amoore	2013:	61).		Derivative	forms	of	risk	are	‘precisely	indifferent	to	whether	a	particular	event	occurs	or	not.	What	matters	instead	is	the	capacity	to	act	in	the	face	of	uncertainty’	(2013:	62).		Calculation	in	this	sense	is	not	that	which	tracks	from	the	past	into	the	present	and	on	into	the	future	–	as	predictive	modes	of	analysis	would	imply	–	but	is	closer	to	the	definition	that	Callon	and	Muniesa	propose,	whereby	different	entities	are	detached	from	their	context,	‘moved	[into],	arranged	and	ordered	in	a	single	space’	(2005:	1231),	in	which	they	are	manipulated	and	transformed	in	order	to	produce	a	new	entity	that	can	circulate	acceptably	beyond	its	calculative	space.		The	pre-emptive	temporality	through	which	the	politics	of	possibility	function	involves			 more	speculative	and	imaginative	forms	of	calculation.	Where	data	on	past	events	are	incomplete	or	absent,	probabilistic	knowledge	is	loosened	to	incorporate	assumptions	about	that	which	is	merely	possible	(Amoore,	2013:	31).			The	‘merely	possible’	thus	becomes	the	uncertainty	that	is	brought	into	the	present,	the	yet-to-come	that	the	political	axis	must	act	on.		In	what	ways	might	Change4Life	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	politics	of	possibility?		How	does	it	seek	to	act	on	the	future?		And	what	are	the	politics	of	pre-emptive	
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temporality?		In	order	to	address	these	questions,	in	the	rest	of	this	Chapter,	I	unpack	the	conceptions	that	Change4Life	have	of	their	target	markets	through	a	focus	on	the	relationship	between	its	digital	elements	and	the	importance	of	organising	‘real	life’	events	for	some	social	groups	especially.		In	part,	this	focus	is	to	take	account	of	the	range	of	activities	through	which	Change4Life	works,	and,	in	part,	it	is	to	explore	further	the	modes	of	calculation	that	the	campaign	employs.		In	particular,	drawing	on	the	discussions	of	social	marketing	as	experimenting	with	the	extension	of	the	economic	into	the	social	and	of	the	‘speculative	and	imaginative	forms	of	calculation’	(Amoore,	2013:	31)	emerging	as	significant	today,	I	argue	that	Change4Life	be	understood	as	a	mode	of	power	whereby	the	future	as	uncertainty	is	mobilised	to	enrol	specific	‘clusters’9	of	people	of	at	risk	of	obesity	and	thus	as	in	need	of	intervention.			
The	politics	of	futurity	I	have	suggested	that	the	future	as	uncertainty	or	possibility	has	become	an	increasingly	prominent	temporality	of	contemporary	socio-economic	life,	and	that	new	forms	of	calculation	play	a	crucial	role	in	how	government	comes	to	‘act	on	the	future’	(Massumi,	2005:	3).		Importantly,	in	acting	on	the	future,	the	Change4Life	movement	works	with	the	threat	of	obesity	not	via	suggesting	a	dystopia,	but	rather	by	suggesting	the	future	as	a	time	of	possibility.	If	we	change	for	life	now,	if	we	eat	better	and	move	more,	the	future	will	be	happier,	healthier,	longer-lasting.	This	possibility	of	the	future	is	thus	contained	or	pre-empted	within	the	present.	The	emphasis	on	uncertainty	and	possibility	might	seem	to	suggest	that	the	future	is	necessarily	or	inevitably	a	better	time;	indeed,	this	is	what	Change4Life	proposes,	with	its	focus	on	‘the	happily	ever	after’	that	can	be	achieved	with	healthy	eating	and	exercise.		However,	drawing	on	the	discussion	so	far,	I	want	to	argue	that	the	future	as	uncertainty	or	possibility	is	a	means	through	which	power	functions	today.		That	is,	the	pre-emptive	temporality	whereby	the	uncertainty	of	the	future	is	brought	into	the	present,	is	not	felt	or	lived	out	in	the	same	way	by	everyone.		Rather,	both	access	to	and	the	requirement	to	live	out	the	future	as	possibility	is	distributed	unequally.		In	this	sense,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	in	more	detail	the	politics	of	futurity.		In	what	ways	and	with	what	effects/affects	is	pre-emption	a	temporality	that	engages	different	people	differently?			To	argue	that	contemporary	forms	of	power	function	–	at	least	in	part	–	via	the	uncertainty	or	possibility	of	the	future	is	to	draw	through	recent	theories	of	non-representational,	affective	or	post-hegemonic	power.		Scott	Lash,	for	example,	argues	that	power	is	‘a	potentiality	[with]	an	inherent	capacity	for	growth,	development	or	
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coming	into	being’	(2010:	4),	while,	as	discussed	above,	Massumi	(2005)	suggests	that	politics	becomes	organised	around	uncertainty;	the	future	as	the	threat	of	what	might	yet	come10.		It	is	also	to	draw	through	Amoore’s	conception	of	the	forms	of	calculation	that	risk	as	part	of	the	politics	of	possibility	indicate,	where	‘[t]o	manage	risks	ahead	of	time	is	to	enrol	modes	of	calculation	that	can	live	with	emergence	itself,	embrace	and	re-incorporate	the	capacity	for	error,	false	positive,	mistake,	and	anomaly’	(2013:	9).		The	future	as	uncertainty	or	possibility	is	thus	not	necessarily	a	better	time,	somehow	beyond	calculation,	nor	a	time	that	can	be	predicted	or	controlled.		Instead,	the	uncertainty	of	the	future	has	itself	been	brought	into	the	scope	of	calculation.		The	uncertainty	of	the	future	has,	I	suggest,	come	to	matter	more.		And,	in	keeping	with	the	ways	in	which	power	involves	some	more	than	others,	the	future	as	uncertainty	is	(made	to)	matter	to	some	more	than	others.		There	are	many	ways	in	which	Change4Life	seeks	to	pre-emptively	enrol	particular	groups	of	people	as	at	risk	of	obesity.		As	Evans	et	al.	(2011)	have	argued,	Change4Life’s	focus	on	improving	children’s	weight	and	health	targets	mothers	as	‘gatekeeper	of	diet	and	activity’	(Department	of	Health,	cited	in	Evans	et	al.,	2011:	332)	and	‘aims	to	produce	healthy	bodies	through	acting	on	intergenerational	relations’	(2011:	331).		Indeed,	children	are	also	seen	as	a	site	of	possibilty,	not	only	because	of	their	age,	but	also	because	they	can	‘“transmit”	health	education’	to	and	between	adults,	for	instance	by	relaying	information	learnt	at	school	to	their	parents	(Evans	et	al.,	2011:	336).				Of	interest	here	however,	is	the	significant	range	of	Change4Life	activities	that	occur	online,	with	a	website	that	is	regularly	updated	and	a	facility	that	allows	interested	people	to	sign	up	for	emails	that	give	them	ideas	for	new	ways	to	eat	better	and	move	more.		Interestingly,	in	a	Department	of	Health	Equity	Analysis	document	that	outlines	the	requirement	of	a	social	marketing	campaign	for	health	in	England	(of	which	Change4Life	is	one	aspect),	these	specific	aspects	of	the	campaign	are	understood	by	as	engaging	‘wealthier,	better-educated	people	with	managerial	jobs’	(2011:	3).	In	contrast:		 While	access	to	new	technologies	has	been	growing	rapidly,	there	are	still	nine	million	people	in	the	UK	who	have	never	accessed	the	internet.	These	people	are	more	likely	to	be	older,	to	have	fewer	qualifications	and	lower	income	than	those	who	do	use	the	internet.	In	addition,	there	are	4.8	million	people	living	in	Great	Britain	who	report	that	they	never	read	or	even	glance	through	a	newspaper.	
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Moreover,	4.4	million	people	report	that	they	never	watch	any	television	news	or	current	affairs	programming.	785,000	people	could	be	termed	‘information	poor’	in	that	they	fall	into	both	groups	(2011:	3).			The	‘information	poor’	are	in	many	cases	the	social	groups	–	or	‘clusters’	–	that	the	campaign	wants	to	reach	in	order	to	change	behaviour.		In	particular,	it	is	worth	noting	that	a	‘bespoke’	ethnic	minority	campaign	was	commissioned	from	a	‘specialist	ethnic	minority	marketing	agency’	and	launched	in	Luton	in	late	2009.	The	programme	included	publishing	materials	in	languages	other	than	English,	working	closely	with	primary	care	trusts,	local	authorities,	healthcare	professionals	and	others	working	with	communities,	including	‘engaging	authority	figures	(such	as	faith	leaders)’	and	‘working	with	respected	celebrities	from	the	communities’	(Department	of	Health,	2010:	76).		Indeed,	while	the	Change4Life	campaign	in	general	extended	from	published	materials	and	print	and	broadcast	adverts	into	the	‘real	world’,	the	more	specialised	ethnic	minorities	campaign	placed	particular	emphasis	on	the	significance	of	this	(real-world)	aspect.			
	In	Luton,	for	example,	Change4Life	worked	in	partnership	with	the	local	Borough	Council	to	organise	a	series	of	events,	including	the	Stockwood	Family	Fun	Day	in	2009,	and	another	event	at	Wardon	Park	in	2011.		The	Borough	Council	also	initiated	its	own	version	of	Change4Life,	‘Take	3	4	Life’,	which	encourages	adults	to	be	active	at	least	three	times	a	week	for	at	least	30	minutes.	In	Bradford,	another	area	targeted	by	the	Change4Life	bespoke	ethnic	minorities	campaign,	local	Pakistani	and	Bangladeshi	community	leaders	attended	a	Change4Life	conference	in	November	2009	to	learn	about	the	obesity	problem	in	the	locality,	and	to	find	ways	to	address	it.	One	activity	included		 [c]onsultant	nutritionist,	registered	dietician	and	best-selling	author,	Azmina	Govindji,	[…]	demonstrat[ing]	easy	to	follow	steps	to	a	healthier	diet,	giving	traditional	Pakistani	and	Bangladeshi	meals	a	healthier	twist	and	showing	the	audience	a	range	of	“sneaky	swaps”	to	incorporate	the	recommended	5-A-Day	into	their	diets’.11			These	demonstrations	were	then	taken	up	by	community	leaders	in	cooking	workshops,	held	in	local	communities,	and	local	press	highlighted	supermarket	offers	on	fresh	fruit	and	vegetables.	In	addition,	the	Department	of	Health	offered	continued	
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support	on	healthy	eating,	including	in	January	2012	YouTube	cooking	tutorials	hosted	by	the	British	Caribbean	celebrity	chef	Ainsley	Harriott.		In	seeking	to	target	some	of	the	‘at	risk’	clusters	effectively,	the	campaign	seems	to	emphasise	the	need	to	engage	directly,	so	that	‘the	digital’	aspects	of	Change4Life	are	seen	as	distancing	the	message	of	healthiness	from	those	that	it	needs	to	reach.	For	this	message	to	be	effective,	Change4Life	must	intervene	directly	into	the	real,	physical,	actual	
life	of	the	at	risk	groups.		
	Working	as,	and	through,	pre-emption,	the	future	that	the	campaign	imagines	is	thus	not	an	abstract	calculation,	but	is	made	to	matter	in	and	through	various	attempts	to	produce	healthier	and	happier	people.	Here,	it	is	worth	returning	to	the	experimental	and	performative	character	of	both	social	marketing	and	calculation.		The	calculations	made	by	and	circulated	through	Change4Life	are	brought	to	life	and	‘essentially	virtual	notions	[…]	are	able	to	take	on	flesh	as,	increasingly,	the	world	is	made	in	these	notions’	likeness’	(Thrift,	2005:	6).		Here,	then,	as	Amoore	argues,	‘[t]he	contemporary	politics	of	possibility	marks	a	change	in	emphasis	from	the	statistical	calculation	of	probability	to	the	algorithmic	arraying	of	possibilities	such	that	they	can	be	acted	upon’	(2013:	23,	my	emphasis).		Power	operates	not	so	much	‘over’	people,	but	through	enrolling	and	compelling	them	to	act,	to	materialise,	particular	possibilities.	Callon	and	Muniesa’s	(2005)	argument	that	calculation	assembles	together	different	entities,	manipulates	and	transforms	them	and	creates	a	new	entity	might	therefore	be	developed	to	understand	this	new	entity	as	requiring	action.		That	is,	part	of	the	‘appropriate’	or	successful	circulation	of	the	new	entity	beyond	its	initial	calculative	space	is	for	these	calculations	to	be	acted	on,	to	become	flesh.		Change4Life	moves	from	the	calculative	space	of	the	Foresight	document	to	a	range	of	activities	targeted	at	some	social	groups.		The	efficacy	of	Change4Life	is	the	taking	up	of,	the	living	out	of,	these	possible	activities.		And,	as	I	have	argued,	the	acting	out	of	particular	possibilities	is	the	acting	out	of	particular	relationships	to	the	future.				In	this	way,	Change4Life	does	not	so	much	re-draw	social	differences	as	make	social	differences	differently.	This	is	to	argue	that	power,	refracted	through	the	uncertainty	of	the	future,	is	not	only	regulating	social	differences,	but	is	making	or	(re)inventing	difference.	As	a	form	of	governance,	Change4Life	impels	some	more	than	others	to	act	on,	and	act	out,	the	future	as	potential.	For	those	who	belong	to	the	groups	classified	as	at	risk	of	obesity	and	overweight,	the	future	is	brought	into	the	present	via	the	pre-
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emption	of	the	threat	of	obesity,	and	calculations	are	acted	out	in	and	as	flesh,	whether	or	not	they	are	correct	or	plausible.		Social	marketing	plays	a	significant	role	here.	For	example,	one	of	the	justifications	for	deciding	to	tackle	public	health	issues	through	social	marketing	that	the	Department	of	Health	(2011)	makes	is	because			 We	believe	that	the	social	marketing	strategy	[devised	for,	among	others,	the	Change4Life	campaign]	has	the	potential	to	make	a	positive	impact	on	equality	groups,	through	reducing	the	barriers	that	currently	exist,	through	bolstering	motivation	to	change/adopt	healthier	behavior	among	less-engaged	groups	and	increasing	access	to	information	and	other	forms	of	marketing-driven	support’	(2011:	14).				Indeed,	as	the	Department	of	Health	describes	in	its	account	of	the	need	for	social	marketing	to	tackle	public	health	issues,	Change4Life	is	a	movement	that	has			 been	prioritized	because	[it]	address[es]	those	segments	of	the	population	who	are	greatest	users	of	health	services,	because	there	is	prior	evidence	that	marketing	can	have	an	impact	in	these	areas	and/or	because	as	strong	case	can	be	made	that	people’s	lifestyles	are	amenable	to	change’	(Department	of	Health,	2011b:	5,	my	emphasis).			The	uncertainty	of	the	future	and	the	amenability	to	change	that	some	clusters	of	the	population	are	seen	to	have,	have	here	become	not	only	one	of	the	aims	of	Change4Life,	but	one	of	the	ways	in	which	at	risk	groups	are	themselves	calculated	and	targeted.	The	uncertain	future	and	the	capacity	for	constructing	a	different	relationship	to	this	future	becomes	a	means	of	defining	those	bodies	‘at	risk’	of	future	bad	health	and	calculations	become	a	key	way	in	which	these	transformations	are	to	be	acted	out.	The	future	thus	becomes	not	only	an	objective	–	that	which	is	worked	towards	–	but	a	means	through	which	social	differences	are	understood	and	made.	What	this	might	direct	our	attention	towards,	then,	is	‘a	material	reworking	of	time	itself’	(Adkins,	2009:	335,	my	emphasis),	and	how	the	calculations	involved	in	pre-emptive,	rather	than	linear,	time	are	becoming	an	organiser	of	social	difference.		
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Notes	1	In	2009,	at	the	time	of	the	report,	Foresight	was	located	within	the	Department	for	Business	Innovation	and	Skills.	It	is	now	housed	in	the	Government	Office	for	Science.		2	For	reasons	of	space,	in	the	discussion	below	I	discuss	only	Callon	and	Muniesa’s	work.	For	further	STS	work	on	calculation,	see	also:	Latour	(1987);	Callon	(1995);	Barry	(2002);	and	Deville	(forthcoming).	3	Change4Life	website	homepage:	http://www.nhs.uk/change4life/Pages/change-for-life.aspx,	last	accessed	10th	July	2014.	4	Although	as	Moor	notes,	this	is	not	necessarily	an	ever-expanding	influence	(see	2012:	6-7).	5	See	also	Nadesan	(2008)	on	the	construction	of	markets	for	pharmaceutical	interventions	into	mental	health	illnesses.	
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																																																																																																																																																														6	Moor	notes	that	in	the	UK	in	2010,	the	government	was	‘the	fifth	largest	spending	advertiser	in	the	country’	(2012:	3).	7	On	Foresight	and	Change4Life	as	pre-emptive,	see	also	Evans	(2010).	8	Amoore’s	focus	is	on	risk	and	security	post	9/11.	While	it	would	be	a	push	to	define	Change4Life	within	these	terms,	there	are	nevertheless	helpful	connections	to	be	made	between	Amoore’s	argument	and	my	focus	here..	9	The	One	Year	On	report	uses	the	term	‘clusters’	to	define	risk	of	obesity	through	habit	and	behavior,	rather	than	through	classical	sociological	categories	such	as	class	and	ethnicity	(2010:	94).		However,	these	clusters	do	often	map	on	to	pre-existing	categories;	see	Coleman	(2012).			10	See	Coleman	(2012)	for	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	this	point.	11	This	quotation	was	taken	from,	http://www.phn-bradford.nhs.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A265A98B-A9A9-42F5-AFD9-95E243CF3B87/0/Event201109.pdf,	last	accessed	22nd	January	2012,	and	no	longer	live.		See:	http://www.bradford.nhs.uk,	last	accessed	10th	July	2014. 
